

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 050086

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: XJ, PFOR

SUBJECT: AF ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN FY 1979 - PARM

REF: (A) STATE 38338 (B) 38356

1. FOLLOWING IS AF BUREAU'S REGIONAL BROAD TRENDS FORECAST
FOR FY 1979. THIS ASSESSMENT ALONG WITH REFTELS WILL
PROVIDE OVERALL SETTING, TO WHICH THE POLICY ASSESSMENT AND
RESOURC: MANAGEMENT (PARM) INPUT OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
CAN BE GEARED.

2. THE AFRICAN REGION IS LIKELY TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY
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GROWING POLITICAL INSTABILITY, INCLUDING COUPS AND AT-
TEMPTED COUPS, SOME CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE AND VERY UNEVEN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. A NUMBER OF LONG ESTABLISHED AFRICAN
LEADERS ARE ELDERLY AND ONE OR MORE OF THEM ARE LIKELY TO
DIE. AFRICAN UNITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN IDEAL, BUT WITH
THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN
UEST AFRICA THE REALITY IS THAT WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO SEE

INCREASING DIVISION, ALTHOUGH AFRICAN STATES WILL BE LEERY OF UPSETTING THE OAU'S PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOLOA0ILITY OF BORDERS. THESE DIVISIONS RESULT IN PART FROM THE INCREASINGLY BOLD SOVIET ROLE AS AN ARMS SUPPLIER IN AFRICA, AND THE REACTIONS OF FEAR THIS HAS EVOKED. WE EXPECT THAT THE OAU WILL BE SUBJECTED TO INCREASINGLY HARSH TESTS WITH THE LIKELY RESULT THAT IT WILL AVOID CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. SOME COUNTRIES MAY BOYCOTT OAU MEETINGS OR EVEN SUSPEND THEIR MEMBERSHIP.

3. NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES WILL TAKE ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE IN OUR RELATIONS THROUGHOUT AFRICA IN THE COMING YEARS. TOGETHER WITH THE POLITICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THEY WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN OF US POLICY. FOR MOST AFRICANS, OUR ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISSUES OF MAJORITY RULE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN THE TOUCHSTONE BY WHICH THEY WILL JUDGE US.

4. IF, BY FY 1979, THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN ZIM0ABWE AND NAMIBIA IS WELL UNDERWAY WITH THE SU,PORT OF THE ,FRONT LINE" STATES, THE US MAY DERIVE SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT IN AFRICAN EYES. DEPENDING ON OUR ACTIONS ON OTHER ISSUES, HOWEVER, OUR CREDIT MAY PROVE TO BE SHORT-LIVED WITH SOME AFRICANS. EVEN IF SOUTHERN AFRICAN EVENTS TAKE A RELATIVELY BENIGN COURSE, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE PRESSURES, BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY WITH MEASURES DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE APARTHEID FROM SOUTH AFRICA. A PEACEFUL SOLU-
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TION TO THE ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIAN ISSUES SHOULD HELP CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE FOR PROGRESS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA. OBVERSELY, AN UNFAVORABLE OUTCOME IN RHODESIA WOULD BE LIKELY TO MAKE THE SOUTH AFRICANS MORE RESISTANT TO CHANGE, AND COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM.

5. WE WOULD EXPECT THE FRONT LINE STATES TO CONTINUE TO RESIST THE INTERVENTION OF OUTSIDE FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICA CONFLICTS. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS NO RESUMPTION OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS OR IF PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS ARE PUNCTUATED BY SERIOUS CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE, THERE MAY BE GROWING PRESSURE TO ALLOW MORE DIRECT SOVIET/CU0AN INTERVENTION IN T;E CONFLICT. US RELATIONS WITH BOT: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD BE STRAINED, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE OPERATING IN AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCTIVE TO THEIR AIMS. EQUALLY, IF SMITH PRESSES AHEAD WITH PRESENTLY ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR AN "INTERNAL SOLUTION, THIS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WITH ATTENDANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNIST

INTERVENTION.

6. WE EXPECT THAT THERE WILL ALSO BE CONTINUING, AND PERHAPS INCREASING TENSIONS IN THE EAST AFRICAN AREA. PARTICULAR ATTENTION WILL HAVE TO BE PAID TO DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE ETHIOPIA AND THE RELATIONS OF THAT COUNTRY WITH ITS

NEIGHBORS. IN WEST AFRICA, WE EXPECT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGERIA WILL IMPROVE AS TRADE AND INVESTMENT INCREASE. US RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE AND THE SUDAN WILL ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT.

7. WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPAND THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION IN AFRICA. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET PENETRATION WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES EVOLVE. SINCE THE ISSUE OF APARTHEID WILL NOT HAVE BEEN SOLVED, AND THE BLACK AFRICAN

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COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO PRESS THE SOUTH AFRICANS UNTIL THIS STAIN IS REMOVED, TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY ARISE WITH VEN MORE FREQUENCY FOR THE USSR. THE BOLDNESS WITH WHICH T;E SOVIETS EXPLOIT SUCH OPPORTUNITIES WILL DEPEND ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH: (1) THE AGING SOVIET LEADERSHIP CAN CONCERT ITS POLICIES; (2) SOVIET ARMS AND PROTECTION ARE IN DEMAND AS A RESULT OF AFRICAN INSTABILITIES; (3) THE WEST LINKS AFRICAN WITH OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES OF MORE DIRECT CONCERN TO THE USSR.

8. THE CHINESE ROLE IN AFRICA APPEARS TO BE DIMINISHING. WHETHER PEKING WILL WISH TO REVERSE THAT COURSE WILL DEPEND ON ITS OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE GENERAL ORIENTATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS CAPABILITIES AND PRIORITIES IN PROVIDING SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

9. SOME OF THE OIL-RICH ARAB STATES, NOTABLY SAUDI ARABIA BUT ALSO LIBYA, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE ON THE CONTINENT. THE SAUDIS WILL PRESUMABLY CONCENTRATE ON COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA, GENERALLY PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE THE STABILITY OF MODERATE GOVERNMENTS, WHILE QADAFI WILL SEEK BACKING FOR HIS RADICAL ANTI-ISRAELI AND ANTI-EGYPTIAN POLICIES AMONG THE AFRICANS. THE ISRAELIS MAY BE ABLE SLOWLY TO STRENGTHEN SOME OF THE REMAINING TIES THEY HAVE WITH CERTAIN BLACK AFRICAN STATES, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING MORE QUICKLY IF A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH ARAB OIL PRICES AND ARAB LARGESSE.

10. THE US SHARE OF TOTAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO AFRICA HAS

BEEN LOWER THAN TO ANY OTHER REGION OF THE WORLD. WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORLD-WIDE EFFORTS TO REDUCE ARMS SALES, AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO AN ARMS RACE IN AFRICA. GROWING INTERNAL DISORDERS, THE IMPLIED THREATS OF MORE HEAVILY ARMED NEIGHBORS, AND THE DESIRE
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OF A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO DIVERSIFY THEIR ARMS

SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS WILL NONETHELESS CAUSE MORE ARMS REQUESTS TO BE DIRECTED TO THE US. WE EXPECT THAT THE AFRICAN MODERATES--THOSE STATES MOST LIKELY TO SUPPORT US ON AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US-- WILL LOOK UPON OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS AN EARNEST OF OUR INTENTION TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE ON THE CONTINENT.

11. WE EXPECT MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE YEARS AHEAD, GIVEN THE RELATIVELY GREATER INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND POVERTY OF THE REGION COMPARED WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. OUR FY 1978 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS FOR AID BILATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA WILL EXCEED THE FY 1977 PROGRAM BY 55 PERCENT. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING INCREASED US CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND.

12. IF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION ARE FAVORABLE, WE WILL NEED ASSISTANCE FOR THE NEWLY EMERGING MAJORITY-RULE STATES TO PERMIT THE RESTRUCTURING OF THEIR ECONOMIES REQUIRED FOR A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL ELEMENTS OF THE POPULACE. IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THOSE COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY THE SPREADING VIOLENCE WILL BE REQUIRED, AND THERE WILL PROBABLY BE VASTLY INCREASED DEMANDS FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE.

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